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M. McCoy, Plato on the Rhetoric of Philosophers and Sophists

M. McCoy, Plato on the Rhetoric of Philosophers and Sophists

Publié le par Bérenger Boulay

Marina McCoy, Plato on the Rhetoric of Philosophers and Sophists. Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press, 2007, viii-212 p. 

ISBN 978-0-521-87863-0. 


Recension par Evan G. Rodriguez and Ravi Sharma (California State University, Long Beach) dans Bryn Mawr Classical Review: 2008.12.36

Présentation de l'éditeur:


Marina McCoy explores Plato's treatment of the rhetoric ofphilosophers and sophists through a thematic treatment of six differentPlatonic dialogues, including Apology, Protagoras, Gorgias, Republic,Sophist, and Phaedras. She argues that Plato presents the philosopherand the sophist as difficult to distinguish, insofar as both userhetoric as part of their arguments. Plato does not present philosophyas rhetoric-free, but rather shows that rhetoric is an integral part ofphilosophy. However, the philosopher and the sophist are distinguishedby the philosopher's love of the forms as the ultimate objects ofdesire. It is this love of the forms that informs the philosopher'srhetoric, which he uses to lead his partner to better understand hisdeepest desires. McCoy's work is of interest to philosophers,classicists, and communications specialists alike in its careful yetcomprehensive treatment of philosophy, sophistry, and rhetoric asportrayed through the drama of the dialogues.

• The only book onthe market covering the topics of philosophy, rhetoric, and sophistrythat looks at six different Plato dialogues in one book • Of interestto specialists in philosophy, classics, and communications • Written inclear and concise language accessible to non-specialists

Sommaire (téléchargeable, format PDF) (69KB):

Acknowledgments page vii 1 Introduction 1 2 Elements of Gorgianic Rhetoric and the Forensic Genre in Plato's Apology 23 3 The Rhetoric of Socratic Questioning in the Protagoras 56 4 The Competition between Philosophy and Rhetoric in the Gorgias 85 5 The Dialectical Development of the Philosopher and Sophist in the Republic 111 6 Philosophers, Sophists, and Strangers in the Sophist 138 7 Love and Rhetoric in Plato's Phaedrus 167 Bibliography 197 Index 209



Extrait:

Introduction (également téléchargeable format PDF)

I.

This book explores how Plato separates thephilosopher from the sophist through the dramatic opposition ofSocrates to rhetoricians and sophists. In one way, its thesis issimple. Plato distinguishes Socrates from the sophists by differencesin character and moral intention. In the broadest terms, Plato mightagree with Aristotle's claim in the Rhetoric that what definesa sophist is “not his faculty, but his moral purpose” (1355b 17–18). Inanother way, the problem is difficult, for the philosopher and thesophist share many characteristics in how they speak and act; thesesimilarities are not superficial but go to the very heart of what Platopresents as philosophy, sophistry, and rhetoric. The tendency ofcontemporary scholarship has been to emphasize the distinctiveness ofSocratic or Platonic philosophy in terms of a technical methodseparable from rhetoric.1 One reason for this assumption is that Socrates seems to point toward the possibility of such a method in the Gorgias in his contrast between the political art and merely imitative rhetoric (Gorgias464b–466a). However, when one turns to other dialogues, therelationship among philosophy, rhetoric, and sophistry becomes murkier.The Phaedrus seems to show philosophy and rhetoric as compatible, while Book One of the Republicpresents a sophist with an intellectual position about justicealongside Socrates, with arguments that can seem sophistical. Plato's Sophistdefines the sophist but, at one point in the dialogue, the Strangerequates “noble sophistry” with a practice that sounds much likeSocrates' questioning activity (Sophist 230b–c). Plato's Apologyopens with Socrates' claim that he is not a clever speaker, but he thengoes on to rely upon numerous forensic and rhetorical techniques. Evenin the Gorgias, Plato's voice must be distinguished from Socrates' voice as Plato uses the Gorgiasin order to raise as many questions about philosophy and its value ashe does about sophistry and rhetoric. The relation of philosophy torhetoric and sophistry is complex.

   Additionally, the contrast between philosophy andsophistry is a theme that permeates many Platonic dialogues. If oneconsiders the number of dialogues in which Socrates finds himselfconversing with a sophist, a professional rhetorician, or one of theirfollowers (e.g., Euthydemus, Gorgias, Protagoras, Hippias Major, Hippias Minor, Republic); in which Socrates discusses sophists or a particular sophist (e.g., Apology, Theaetetus); or in which the definition of the sophist is abstractly compared with other related enterprises (e.g., Sophist, Statesman), the list is long. If one notes that the term rhetorwas commonly used to refer to any speaker in the Athenian Assembly –adding political works to the debate – then few dialogues would seem not to contribute to a discussion of the issue.2Still, there is no unified account in the dialogues of a specific setof characteristics that define either the sophist or the rhetorician.The Sophist itself claims that the philosopher and the sophist are difficult to distinguish (Sophist216c), and the variety of definitions given – as well as the dramaticcontrast between the Eleatic Stranger's method of philosophizing andthat of Socrates, now silent at his feet – illustrates its difficultyas well.3 The lack of a cleardefinition of philosophy in the dialogues makes a clean and easyseparation of philosopher from sophist all the more difficult. Platoseems less concerned with offering definitions of the philosopher andsophist than with opposing through dramatic conflict the person of the philosopher, Socrates, to a number of different sophists and rhetoricians.

   In this book, I examine the distinction betweenthe philosopher and the sophist in six of Plato's dialogues, withparticular attention to the differences between philosophical andsophistical rhetoric. My argument focuses on three interrelated theses.First, I argue that Plato's treatment of Socrates in conversation withsophists and rhetoricians indicates that he thought that thedistinction between philosopher and sophist was difficult to make.There is no single method or mode of discourse that separates thephilosopher from the sophist. One cannot simply say that thephilosopher is logical while the sophist is illogical, that thephilosopher uses pure reason with no attention to rhetoric while thesophist persuades apart from reason, or that the philosopher has asuccessful method of speaking while the sophist lacks one. Nor are thesophists consistently presented as disinterested in knowledge or asmorally corrupt. The meanings of the terms philosopher and sophistare disputed at the time that Plato is writing; for Plato, the claimthat Socrates is a philosopher rather than a sophist is a normativerather than merely a descriptive claim. At times, Plato's dialogueseven express some ambivalence as to whether the distinction can be madeas clearly as the character Socrates himself wishes to make it. Carefulattention to the multiple layers of Plato's dialogues reveals aSocrates who sometimes looks more like his opponents than he would liketo admit and vice versa.

   Second, I argue that philosophy, as Platounderstands it, includes important rhetorical dimensions. While attimes Plato associates the sophist with the rhetorician, he alsopresents Socrates' philosophical practice as rhetorical.4 While the term rhetorikê was a relatively new term at the time Plato wrote, and its meaning shifts from dialogue to dialogue, when I use the term rhetoric here, I mean its broad, contemporary sense of “the means used to persuade through words.” My definition of rhetorichere is deliberately general, for Socrates does not limit his use ofrhetoric to one or two devices; his rhetoric is guided by theparticular needs of the soul of the person with whom he is speaking.Socrates is interested in persuading his audience and not always orexclusively through affecting the intellects of his interlocutors. Forexample, Socrates often attempts to affect others' senses of shame,anger, confusion, happiness, pleasure, and displeasure. In the Republic,Socrates seems as interested in making Thrasymachus feel flustered andashamed as in disproving his claims about the nature of justice.5This is because the goal of Socrates' argument is to affect a person aswell as to prove a thesis. Socrates also uses techniques common tosophists and rhetoricians such as eikos (probability argument), êthopoiia(portrayal of character), antithesis, cross-examination, andparallelism. In addition, he is ready to use myths, poeticinterpretations, images, and other devices in order to affect hisaudience.

   To an extent, Socrates' philosophical practice iscontinuous with the rhetoric of others whom Socrates would not considerphilosophical. For this reason, a single definition of philosophicalrhetoric that distinguishes it from sophistical rhetoric is notpossible. The rhetoric that a philosopher must use is determined notonly by the content of his subject matter but also by the audience towhom he speaks. While later philosophers such as Aristotle, Cicero, andAugustine took pains to distinguish and to separate the rhetoricalelements of speech from dialectic or philosophical discovery, we findno such clean separation in the Platonic dialogues. Instead, we find aclose connection between philosophical practice and rhetoric. At times,Socrates' questions seem to be designed to refute or to defend thecontent of some specific thesis but, more often than not, we find thatsomething else is also going on: for example, Socrates examines thesoul of the person whom he is questioning or hopes to affect the thumosof his interlocutor rather than his intellect alone. I argue here thatSocrates' rhetorical practice, and his very concept of philosophy,relies more upon phronêsis and kairos than upon atechnical approach to philosophical method. Plato, too, exhibits thissort of rhetorical attentiveness to the particulars. As author of thedialogues, Plato separates Socrates from the sophists by dramaticallyjuxtaposing them in different circumstances. Plato uses elements offorensic speech, tragedy, comedy, sophistical set pieces, and otherGreek genres in his dialogues in a way that affects our own perceptionas readers of Socrates and his opponents.6One cannot offer a comprehensive definition of “Socratic rhetoric” or“Platonic rhetoric” because what constitutes good philosophical andrhetorical practice changes, depending on the topic and audience.Philosophy and rhetoric are closely interrelated. The content ofthought and its discovery and formal expression in speech areintertwined.

   Third, I argue that Plato differentiates thephilosopher from the sophist primarily through the virtues of thephilosopher's soul. One consistent thread in Plato's differentiation ofSocrates from the sophists is how Socrates embodies moral virtues. Thedifference between the philosopher and the rhetorician is not to befound in a distinctive technique or method, in the absence or presenceof rhetoric, or in some sort of foundational knowledge. Instead,Plato's ultimate defense of philosophy is to be found in thephilosopher's person – that is, in his character and the orientation ofhis soul to the forms. Dialogues such as the Gorgias, Republic, and Phaedruscontain extensive descriptions of the virtues of the philosopher, butthese accounts have too often been ignored as secondary to questions ofmethod. However, for Plato, these virtues are closely connected to theproper expression of ideas in speech. For example, the Gorgias focuses on not only knowledge but also goodwill (eunoia) and frankness (parrhesia) as central to the evaluation of what constitutes good logos. The Phaedrusdistinguishes between different types of souls, each oriented towarddifferent goods, some of which are higher than others; good rhetoric isconnected to loving the forms and one's partner in conversation. Themiddle books of the Republic focus overwhelmingly on the soulof the philosopher and the characteristics that both separate and makehim apparently close to the sophist. Above all, Socrates' questioningis guided by his love of and his desire to care for the souls of thoseto whom he speaks.

   A central defining characteristic of thephilosopher is his desire for the forms. However, this theoreticalcommitment to the forms should not be understood primarily as a matterof having the correct metaphysics or as a positive epistemologicalstate. That is, it would be a mistake simply to say that thephilosopher knows the forms while the sophist does not. Instead, thesedialogues emphasize the philosopher's desire for the forms as hisprimary connection to them; his quest for better knowledge of themstems from his love. This love of the forms has consequences for thephilosopher's character. Plato closely connects moral virtues such aswisdom, courage, openness to criticism, and self-knowledge to the loveof a transcendent good outside of oneself. Moreover, the philosopher'slove of the forms affects how he speaks to others – ultimately, inorder to guide others to love and to seek the forms as well. In thissense, the philosopher's theoretical stance ought to be understood interms of the more primary meaning of the Greek term theoria asa kind of a vision of the world and oneself in relation to that world.His theoretical commitments are part of his character and identity as aperson. However paradoxical it may seem, the philosopher ischaracterized by a love of the forms that precedes his knowledge ofthem. In other words, the philosopher is someone who is “turned toward”the forms as the object of his love; his stance is a moral rather thansimply an intellectual position. Such a position helps to explain theinseparability of rhetoric and philosophy, moral virtue andintellectual virtue. Plato suggests that the understanding of our owndesires grounds our theoretical outlook on the world and, in turn, ourrhetoric is guided by our moral-theoretical vision.

   While Plato evaluates rhetorical practice on thebasis of these virtues of character, character is difficult to discernfrom the outside. To put it simply, who we are determines how we speak,but it is difficult to discern the character and motive of a speakerfrom his words alone. For example, Socrates might be genuinelyconcerned with improving his interlocutor but seem to others only to beinterested in winning the argument. It is especially difficult to showintellectuals who already reject the philosopher's commitments that thephilosopher's intentions are really the best. For these reasons,Socrates at times appears to be sophistical and the sophists at timesappear to be philosophical.

   Plato's dialogues do not sweep aside thesecomplexities but rather present with care the problems inherent indistinguishing philosophical from sophistical practice. Plato is notonly aware of the potential confusion of the philosopher and thesophist: at times he also even heightens the difficulty, instead ofresolving it, in order to further explore the nature of philosophy.Plato's dialogues do not always present a clear and decisive victoryfor philosophy over rhetoric or sophistry from the point of view of thesophists themselves. More often than not, figures such as Protagoras,Gorgias, and Polus walk away from conversation with Socrates not at allpersuaded that the life he advocates is better than their own. Thesophists and rhetoricians with whom Socrates argues do not even seem tounderstand what Socrates' real aims are: Callicles in the Gorgias calls Socrates a “demagogue” (dêmêgoros) (Gorg. 482c); Polus says that Socrates takes delight into leading others into inconsistency (Gorg. 461c); and Thrasymachus says that Socrates refutes others out of a love of honor (Rep. 336c). Protagoras more generously suggests that someday Socrates will become famous for his wisdom (Prot.361e), but his implication is that Socrates is above all striving for agood reputation. If Socrates' opponents in the dialogues all too oftenhave a hazy sense of what he is doing in his discussions with them,Plato as author does not immediately and decisively clear up theproblem for us. Instead, the dialogues force us to consider the valueof philosophy in contrast to sophistry in a more nuanced way. In thissense, Plato as dramatist acts as a philosopher as well, using rhetoricto draw his own readers into questioning the value of philosophy, so toencourage the development of virtue in his readers.


II.

Before beginning an inquiry into how Platounderstands philosophy, rhetoric, and sophistry, it is worthconsidering how his contemporaries approached the problem. Somecommentators have argued that Plato was so concerned to separate thesort of rhetoric associated with sophistry from that associated withphilosophy that he invented a vocabulary in order to assist him in thisenterprise. Although modern readers often associate the term sophistwith something along the lines of a clever argumentative individualwith no concern for the truth, the reality is that the meaning of theterm sophist (sophistes) was rather fluid in the fifth and fourth centuries. As Kerferd has argued,7 the term sophist was originally applied to poets, musicians, rhapsodes, Pre-Socratic philosophers, and traveling teachers of “excellence” (aretê ). Aristophanes' Clouds groups Socrates together with the sophists, while Plato's Apology attempts to separate him from them. Socrates himself, without a hint of irony, calls Diotima the ultimate sophist (hoi teleoi sophistai) in the Symposium (Symp. 208c).8 The term sophistwas used to describe, more narrowly, teachers of excellence who tookfees for their services as they traveled; and, more widely,intellectuals who put a priority on the value of speeches for livingwell; or, most broadly of all, a “wise person.” The shift from thebroader and more positive sense of the term to a more negative andlimited one seems to have taken place gradually over the course of thefifth century.

   Schiappa has argued that Plato most likely coined the term rhetorikê, a term found in the Gorgias and Phaedrus (although, surprisingly, not in the Protagoras or Sophist), while the fragments of the historical sophists contain only more general terms such as rhetor, or logos and legein. He suggests that Plato may also have invented the terms eristikê, dialektikê, and antilogikê as part of this endeavor to distinguish philosophy from sophistry.9 While Schiappa is right that Plato played a formative role in developing the terms philosophia and rhetorikê,he was not alone in his attempts to use such language to defend aparticular rhetorical practice vis-à-vis other rhetorical practices inAthens at the time. Not only Plato but also Isocrates and Alcidamas layclaim to the title of philosophy and criticize sophistry. All threecompare and contrast philosophy to rhetoric and sophistry. Alcidamaseven uses the term rhetorikê in his essay, “On Those Who Write Written Speeches,” a speech roughly contemporaneous with Plato's writing.10 However, what each author intends by the term philosophia is quite different and, in some cases, perhaps not even identifiable as philosophy from the standpoint of a modern reader.11Alcidamas writes an extensive defense of the greater value of thespoken word over written speeches, associating philosophy with thosewho devote themselves to becoming good speakers and sophistry withthose who pursue writing. For Alcidamas, both rhetorikê and philosophiaare terms that apply to a life devoted to learning to become a betterspeaker; written speeches only distract or impede a person frompursuing this life of excellence. In contrast, Isocrates disagreesopenly with both Alcidamas and Plato about the best rhetoricalactivities. Isocrates is not only a leading competitor of Plato's inoffering a distinct kind of moral and political education. He is also acompetitor for the very title of philosopher and repeatedly makesnormative claims about the true nature of philosophy, which heassociates with his own rhetorical practice. For Isocrates, thepractice of philosophia is something more akin to being asteward of culture, being well educated in cultural traditions and thenusing those traditions in writing and in speech to contribute back tothe polis.12 For Isocrates, philosophiais concerned not with abstract ideas but rather with speeches orientedtoward making others act in concrete and specific political situations.Philosophy ought to concern itself with “noble” projects, whilesophistry is overly concerned with abstract arguments over uselessmatters. Good rhetoric presents a clear course of action to follow andpreferably addresses those with the power to effect change. One findsno role for the transcendent in Isocrates' conception of philosophy.13Plato's attention to the forms as objects of knowledge and his concernwith general and abstract truths, not always connected to historicallylocated political concerns, separate Isocrates and Plato.14 But if Plato does not always treat rhetorikê as a political practice, he is the exception to the rule: for most Greeks, a rhetorwould have called to mind a speaker in the Athenian Assembly, and thepractice of oratory automatically would have been taken to mean publicdiscourse.15 When Socrates suggests to Phaedrus that the domain of rhetorikêincludes both public and private discourse, Phaedrus is puz- zled, forthis is the first time he has ever heard of such a thing (Phaedrus 261a–b). For the ancient Athenians, rhetoric is understood primarily as a civic art.16

   Nonetheless, Plato and Isocrates share more incommon with each other than with their predecessors. Like Plato,Isocrates was a follower of Socrates, although Isocrates also studiedwith Gorgias. As is true in Plato's case, Isocrates is known primarilyas the author of written works rather than as a speaker; yet, bothwrite works in close imitation or adaptation of dramatic or oratoricalforms. Isocrates goes out of his way to deny that he is a “rhetor ” (To Philip 1; To the Rulers of the Mytilenaens7.5). He also distinguishes himself from the sophists, whom he sees asconcerned with useless and abstract matters such as “deposits” or“humble bees and salt” (Panegyricus 188–189; Encomium to Helen 12). Isocrates wants his philosophical education to help others to become better citizens or leaders; Plato in the Republic sets out a similar role for philosophers of the best city.17

   Moreover, there is a moral core to bothIsocrates' and Plato's visions of education, even if theirunderstandings of how we discover justice are different. Isocratesargues that speeches ought to help us to become more just, and he doesnot view justice as completely relative to opinion. While we must relyupon opinion (doxa) rather than knowledge (epistêmê ) – since epistêmê is beyond human beings to acquire in political matters – Isocrates also links speech to practical wisdom (Antidosis 255; Nicocles 7).18Wisdom is not the mere ability to persuade a crowd but must includeintelligence and good judgment as well. A good speaker must possessexperience as well as have a natural talent for speech and goodtraining; he must understand the past well enough to aid him in gooddeliberation.19 While typically Platohas been seen as holding knowledge far above opinion, Socrates'reliance on his interlocutors' opinions as the starting point ofinquiry (e.g., in the Gorgias, Protagoras, and Charmides)and his reluctance to make knowledge claims (e.g., denying that he is ateacher) suggest the importance of opinion in good argument in Plato'sthinking as well.20 Isocrates seesphilosophy as linked to everyday affairs, but the dramatic form ofPlato's dialogues also consistently connects philosophical argument todramatic and political events contemporary with the characters – forexample, the setting of the Gorgias is Gorgias' visit to Athens to persuade the Assembly to send troops to protect his polis.Isocrates' and Plato's rhetorical practices overlap in important ways,but they are competing with one another for the title of philosopherrather than rhetor or sophist.